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Abstract
Processing facial emotion, especially mismatches between facial and verbal messages, is believed to be important in the
detection of deception. For example, emotional leakage may accompany lying. Individuals with superior emotion
perception abilities may then be more adept in detecting deception by identifying mismatch between facial and verbal
messages. Two personal factors that may predict such abilities are female gender and high emotional intelligence (EI).
However, evidence on the role of gender and EI in detection of deception is mixed. A key issue is that the facial processing
skills required to detect deception may not be the same as those required to identify facial emotion. To test this possibility,
we developed a novel facial processing task, the FDT (Face Decoding Test) that requires detection of inconsistencies
between facial and verbal cues to emotion. We hypothesized that gender and ability EI would be related to performance
when cues were inconsistent. We also hypothesized that gender effects would be mediated by EI, because women tend to
score as more emotionally intelligent on ability tests. Data were collected from 210 participants. Analyses of the FDT
suggested that EI was correlated with superior face decoding in all conditions. We also confirmed the expected gender
difference, the superiority of high EI individuals, and the mediation hypothesis. Also, EI was more strongly associated with
facial decoding performance in women than in men, implying there may be gender differences in strategies for processing
affective cues. It is concluded that integration of emotional and cognitive cues may be a core attribute of EI that contributes
to the detection of deception.
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Introduction
Lying and deception are highly pervasive [1]. DePaulo et al.’s
[2] classic diary study suggested that almost everybody lies at least
once a week, and about 30% of lies regard feelings. People tell lies
to pretend that they feel better than they do or to signal agreement
with their partners. For successful deception, the verbal message
should be coherent with nonverbal signals. Lewis [3] argues that
emotional deception is part of ‘normal’ socialization (e.g., parents
encourage their children to smile even if a gift was disappointing).
Ekman and Friesen [4] pointed out that in order to deceive others
her/his inner state, the liar can 1) simulate an emotional
expression when s/he does not feel any emotion 2) mask emotion
that s/he really feels with another emotional expression or 3) try to
neutralize emotion s/he feels by showing neutral expression.
However, fake emotional expression may be accompanied by
emotional ‘‘leakage’’. Even people adept at masking and
simulating emotion cannot prevent leakage of real emotions [5].
The leakage of real emotions appears especially in the upper part
of the face [6]. Emotional leakage has been demonstrated in
studies of micro-expressions. According to Ekman [7], deception
may be accompanied by a brief (,1/15 s) facial expression of
emotion inconsistent with the speaker’s statements. Speakers may
have various motivations for concealing emotion. Such motiva-
tions are not necessarily deceptive, but deception may be one of
the main contexts in which inconsistent microexpressions are
expressed [8,9].
Evidence from studies of microexpressions [8] implies that
detection of microexpressions may contribute to competence in
the detection of deception. The everyday lie may often be
accompanied by a facial – verbal inconsistency. However, research
need not focus solely on microexpressions. A recent, large-scale
study [6] found that deceptive facial emotional expressions often
lasted up to a full second, i.e., longer than microexpressions as
defined by Ekman [7]. Furthermore, complete deceptive expres-
sions were rare; partial microexpressions associated with only one
part of the face were more common. Deceptive expressions were
more common in the lower part of the face, perhaps because
people have difficulty in voluntarily controlling the medial part of
the frontalis muscle.
The present study thus focused on detection of inconsistency
between relatively long duration facial emotion (2 s) and verbal
content. There is rather little previous research on such
inconsistencies. In the criminal justice system, it is often believed
that the appropriateness of expressed emotion is important for
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evaluating the credibility of suspects and witnesses. For example,
in the recent case of Amanda Knox, accused of murdering her
friend in Perugia, Italy, her failure to express appropriate grief was
one factor that led police to suspect her guilt [10]. Kaufmann et al.
[11] showed in a simulation study that evaluations of the
credibility of a rape victim’s testimony were influenced by the
extent to which she expressed socially-defined appropriate
emotions such as despair. Another line of evidence comes from
studies of depression. Clinical evidence suggests that depressed
individuals may be adept at detecting false reassurances [12].
Dysphoric individuals are indeed more competent than controls in
detecting lies made during videotaped statements, although they
are also superior at detecting lies from voice alone [13].
Individual differences in deception detection
Detecting lies requires paying attention to appropriate cues and
interpreting them correctly. Nonetheless, studies showed that
detection of deception among non-trained people as well as
professionals only slightly exceeds the level of guessing (for review
see: [14]). Indeed, knowledge about deception cues among both
professionals (e.g., police officers) and lay persons is mostly
incorrect [15]. Students have the same incorrect beliefs about the
relevant cues indicating deception as customs officers, police
detectives, police patrol officers and prison guards [16]. Appar-
ently, prisoners have the most accurate knowledge about
deception cues, because success in their world depends on their
ability to detect deceit [16].
Although some researchers claim that it is unclear whether
detection of deception is a stable characteristic [17] and meta-
analysis lead to pessimistic conclusions [18], results of several
studies suggest that people consistently vary in lie detection skills
[19,20]. Indeed, some researchers claim that ‘truth wizards’ –
people who are particularly accurate in lie detection – really do
exist [21,22,23]. It could be hypothesized that individuals
exhibiting high emotional and social skills are better lie detectors.
DePaulo and Tang [24] shown that observers low in social anxiety
are better in deception detection than the ones with high scores.
Deception detection is also positively correlated with self-
awareness, which provides information about both one’s own
and someone else’s mind [25]. However, extraversion, sociability
and trust, which are as well socially valuable characteristics, are
negatively correlated with discrimination between real and
fabricated memories, while neuroticism facilitates effective lie
detection [26,27].
Analyses of gender differences also lead to inconsistent
conclusions. On the one hand women are superior in detecting
deception of their romantic partners [28]. This difference could be
explained with their predominance in reading nonverbal cues
(including facial expressions). Women are also superior in
experimental ‘mind-reading’ tasks, i.e., inferring the thoughts
and feelings of an acquaintance or partner from observing their
behavior [29] and in perceptual sensitivity to very subtle non-
verbal affective signals (e.g. positive facial expression) [30].
Females pay more attention to nonverbal cues and consider more
of them during decision making [31,32]. On the other hand,
women’s superiority vanishes in case of interaction with strangers
[33].
Given that deception processes are highly emotionally loaded,
gender differences in this area may result from more general sex
differences in emotional processes. Gender differences in emo-
tional experience, emotional expression, and nonverbal commu-
nication behaviors relating to emotion are among the most
confirmed disparities between males and females [34]. Both
differential socialization [35,36] and evolutionary processes (e.g.,
[37]) may contribute to gender differences. Females have greater
ability than males to perceive facial expressions of emotion as early
as three years of age, but there may be various sociocultural
moderator factors [38,39,40]. There may also be qualitative
differences between the genders in which regions of the brain are
activated during the perception of emotional expressions [41,42].
Furthermore, literature reviews [43], as well as more recent studies
(e.g., [44]), suggest a modest female advantage in accurate emotion
recognition. Although some well-designed and substantial studies
have failed to show any gender difference in facial emotion
decoding [45], it is highly probable that some uncontrolled causes
were responsible for the lack of gender effect (e.g., ceiling effect in
the Hoffman et al.’s study [45]).
How emotional intelligence can facilitate deception
detection
Existing research has successfully sought for relatively reliable
cues enabling effective deception detection (e.g., [46]), attempted
to identify groups that perform better in lie detection (e.g., [21]),
and investigated whether deception detection can be trained (e.g.,
[47]). However, it is unclear which individual difference variables
would systematically enhance or weaken individual accuracy in
judging deception [18]. In the present study, we examine whether
emotional intelligence may prove crucial for individual effective-
ness in detecting ‘emotional liars’.
Emotional intelligence (EI) has been one of the most often
investigated, albeit controversial constructs, in contemporary
psychology, since its introduction in 1990 by Peter Salovey and
John Mayer [48] (see for a review: [49]). Development of reliable
and valid measurement instruments has been especially problem-
atic (e.g., [50]). Among numerous EI theories, the ability-based
model developed by Mayer and Salovey [51] seems to have the
strongest theoretical and empirical bases. Its strengths include its
low redundancy with personality and IQ, and objective nature of
EI measurement (i.e., maximum performance test). The MSCEIT
test based on the model also appears to be a valid predictor of
effectiveness in social and interpersonal activities [52,53]. There-
fore, we adopted the model as the conceptual basis for the present
study.
Mayer and Salovey [51] distinguish four branches, each
describing one group of emotional abilities: 1) perception,
appraisal, and expression of emotion, 2) emotional facilitation of
thinking, 3) understanding and analysing emotions, and employing
emotional knowledge, and 4) reflective regulation of emotion.
Each of the particular abilities constituting each branch may prove
vital for detecting emotional deception.
First, an ability to identify emotion in other people (second ability of
branch 1), which is often considered a core ability of EI [54], seem
necessary (albeit not sufficient) for detecting emotional leakage and
unmasking emotional liars. It seems obvious that without effective
perception of emotion an individual is unable to detect an
emotional deceit. Mayer and Salovey [51] explicitly describe an
‘‘ability to discriminate between (…) honest dishonest expressions of feeling’’
(p. 11) as a symptom of the highest level of branch 1 abilities.
However, emotional perception is not the only ability necessary for
detecting emotional lies. Emotional facilitation of thought, particularly
an ability to use emotion to direct attention to important
information, may support more basic emotional perception skills.
Emotional understanding abilities, including recognizing relations
between words and emotions themselves, help in interpreting the
meaning that emotions convey regarding interpersonal interac-
tions, as well as in recognizing likely transitions among emotions
(see: [51]). Such emotional reasoning processes seem particularly
important when one has to combine an interlocutor’s verbal
Emotional Intelligence and Detection of Deception
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expressions with information coming from their facial expressions
(such a ‘‘combined’’ strategy facilitates detecting deception [46]).
Even the emotional regulation branch may prove useful in deception
detection as it contains abilities ‘‘to reflectively engage or detach from
emotion depending on its judged informativeness and utility’’ as well as to
‘‘reflectively monitor emotions in relation to oneself and other’’ ([51], p. 11).
Two studies have investigated EI in the context of deception.
One revealed that individuals higher in the ability to perceive and
express emotions feign emotions more convincingly than others,
but they were still not immune to emotional leakage [5]. Similar
results were reported by Elfenbein et al. [55]; however, in this
study only emotion recognition ability, not overall EI, was
measured. Both these studies investigated deception skills. The
other relevant study [56], tested whether high EI was a major
characteristic of ‘detection wizards’. Paradoxically, although total
EI score was not related to discrimination of truths and lies, the
perception branch score proved negatively related to detecting
deceptive targets. However, the experiment design in this
experiment was rather specific, engaging real-life videos of
individuals emotionally pleading for the safe return of their
missing family member, half of whom were responsible for the
missing one’s disappearance (or murder). Therefore, this study
considered high-stakes emotional deception, and presented liars
who could be characterized as psychopaths. Results may not
generalize to the mundane lies of ‘everyday’ situations.
Perhaps as a result of gender differences in emotional-cognitive
processes previously described in the previous section (see also:
[57]), females are superior over males in EI, when the construct is
considered as an ability and measured with a performance test
(e.g., [58]). For self-reported measures the results are inconsistent,
depending on the EI subscale (e.g., [59]). What is interesting, in
some cases gender may moderate a relationship between EI and
other variables (e.g., [60]). In the present study we used a
performance-based measure of EI to investigate gender differences
in detection of inconsistency in combined facial and verbal
emotional signals.
Aims and hypotheses
In the present study we aimed to determine whether EI predicts
the ability to detect inconsistencies in emotional and verbal signals,
using a novel facial-verbal decoding task for this purpose.
Detection of such ‘mixed messages’ may contribute to lie
detection. We hypothesized that (H1) higher EI is related to
higher effectiveness in detection of inconsistency. Moreover, we
presumed that (H2) females will score higher on an ability EI
measure than males. These two hypotheses also imply that (H3)
females should be more effective in detecting inconsistency than
males. If EI is the critical factor in the gender difference, we also
expect that (H4) the difference in detecting inconsistency may be
statistically mediated by EI.
Method
Participants
210 research subjects (university students and community
sample, Caucasians, 50% females) took part in the study (age
range 18–53, M= 23.7, SD= 3.02). All subjects reported having
normal or corrected to normal vision. They were naı¨ve as to the
purpose of the experiment. They were not rewarded.
Ethic statement
All participants provided their informed consent to take part in
the research prior to the experiment. The consent was obtained
twice: a verbal one while participants were being invited to take
part in the experiment and another one via the computer
program. The second consent was obtained after detailed
instruction. Participants were asked to write down their initials
(recorded in a separate file in order to maintain anonymity) and
press ‘‘next’’ button if they agreed to take part in the experiment.
Otherwise they did not participate in the research. The study was
approved by the Ethics Board at the Faculty of Psychology
University of Warsaw. The participants were treated in accor-
dance with ethical guidelines of Ethics Board of Faculty of
Psychology University of Warsaw.
Measures and stimuli
Emotional intelligence. EI was measured with TIE - the
Emotional Intelligence Test [61]. This 24-item ability test was
constructed on the basis of Mayer and Salovey’s [51] four-factor
model. The whole test consists of two parts with different
instructions. Respondents are asked to read a series of descriptions
of social interactions. In the first part, referring to Perception and
Understanding, participants are asked to reflect on feelings and
thoughts of persons who were involved in described situations. The
task is to evaluate, on a 1–5 Likert scale, the probability that a
person involved in the situation experiences each of them. In the
second part, referring to Facilitation and Management, test-takers
are asked to indicate the most advisable action that a protagonist
should implement in order to solve the problem. The task is to
judge, on a 1–5 Likert scale, the level of appropriateness of each of
the three actions described on the answer sheet. Similarly to
MSCEIT scoring [62] expert criteria were employed to determine
the correctness of answers. The TIE responses are scored on four
scales, consistent with Mayer and Salovey’s [51] theory: Percep-
tion (Cronbach’s a= .70), Understanding (a= .69), Assimilation
(a= .65), Emotion Management (a= .66) and General Score
(a= .88) [61]. TIE is a maximum performance test, intended to
measure actual emotional abilities or ‘‘ability-based EI’’. In terms
of construct validity, the test has revealed a very similar pattern of
relationships with established scales to the MSCEIT, correlating
with fluid and crystallized intelligence (r= .35 and r= .26,
respectively), with the strongest correlations for Understanding
branch (similar to MSCEIT). TIE is generally independent from
Big Five personality traits (only the dimension of Agreeableness
revealed a significant relationship(r= .16), (similar to MSCEIT). As
for convergent validity, TIE proved significantly correlated with
SIE-T [63] (Polish test based on MSCEIT Faces subtest) and a
Polish adaptation of Schutte et al.’s [64] Self-Report Inventory
(SSRI). Stolarski, Bitner and Zimbardo [65] reported a correlation
of .36 (p,.01) between TIE and the Popular Questionnaire of
Emotional Intelligence [66].
Reasoning based on facial expressions. We consider lie
detecting a complex cognitive-emotional task that requires
comparing information emanating from multiple sources, e.g.,
facial expressions and verbal communications. Comparison of
items of information is likely to be attentionally demanding,
requiring use of working memory. The Face Decoding Test (FDT)
is a specially designed computer test developed to measure
individual effectiveness in reasoning based on facial expressions.
The test consists of facial expressions, each followed by a sentence,
both presented on a computer screen. Participants were asked to
assess on 4 point scale whether the person who showed a particular
emotional expression could honestly have said a presented
sentence. The Vanger, Hoenlinger and Haken [67] computer
generated prototypes of facial expressions of emotions were used in
the FDT. These included facial expressions of basic emotions (joy,
sadness, fear, disgust, anger, surprise), neutral facial expressions, as
well as facial expressions composed of two inconsistent emotions –
Emotional Intelligence and Detection of Deception
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different for upper and lower facial muscles (e.g., the facial
expression of a false/fake smile was composed of a neutral facial
expression in the upper part of the face and joy in the lower part of
the face). Presentation of these inconsistent facial expressions is
pivotal for the whole idea of FDT, and for the present study.
Emotional expression in the upper part of a face is less susceptible
to intentional control, and, consequently, remains the more
reliable indicator of truly experienced emotions [8], compared to
the lower part, which is more easily controlled. Thus, we assumed
that emotionally intelligent individuals will base their analysis in
ambiguous situations mainly on the upper face.
Six facial expressions of basic emotions, neutral expression and
eleven facial expressions of inconsistent facial emotions were used.
Inconsistent facial expressions were selected on the basis of
assessments by four competent judges – psychologists who have
expertise in nonverbal communication of emotion, facial expres-
sion of emotion, or face processing. They were asked to indicate
which emotions are most commonly masked, simulated or
neutralized, and to indicate which facial expressions are used to
hide them. Judges watched each inconsistent facial expression
from Vanger, Hoenlinger and Haken’s [67] study and evaluated it
on three five-point scales: 1) commonness of the inconsistent facial
expression in everyday life, 2) frequency of deceptive behavior
connected with this inconsistent facial expression and 3) quality of
computer generated prototype of the facial expression. Based on
their evaluations, eleven inconsistent facial expressions rated
highest on all three dimensions were chosen:
1) Indifference:
a. False smile – neutral facial expression (upper part) and joy
(lower part).
b. False sadness – neutral facial expression (upper part) and
sadness (lower part).
2) Joy:
a. Joy (upper part) and neutral facial expression (lower part).
b. Joy (upper part) and sadness (lower part).
3) Sadness:
a. Sadness (upper part) and neutral facial expression (lower
part).
b. Sadness (upper part) and joy (lower part).
4) Fear:
a. Fear (upper part) and anger (lower part).
b. Fear (upper part) and neutral (lower part).
c. Fear (upper part) and joy (lower part).
5) Anger
a. Anger (upper part) and neutral (lower part).
b. Anger (upper part) and joy (lower part).
For each facial emotional expression six sentences were created.
The same judges assessed each of them on two five-point scales:
probability of appearance of the sentence in everyday life
situations and correspondence of the sentence to a particular
facial emotional expression. For each of the consistent emotional
expressions the two sentences with the highest average judges’
assessments were chosen: one that could be honestly said by a
person on the just presented photograph, and a second which was
inconsistent with the perceived expression (the person could not
say it honestly). For example, for the expression of fear, two
sentences were possible:
1) Consistent: Oh, my God! Watch out!
2) Inconsistent: It’s really beautiful! I like spiders.
In total, 14 unique sets of facial expression and sentence for
basic emotions and neutral face were created.
Also, for each of the inconsistent emotional expressions, the two
sentences with the highest evaluations from the judges were
chosen. Both sentences were written to reflect the emotion
presented on the lower part of face (i.e., the ‘‘mask-emotion’’;
thus neither sentences could be said honestly). E.g., for the
expression of fear masked with indifference:
1) Don’t worry, I believe that everything is going to be alright.
2) It’s not scary at all, I think you are overreacting.
The opposite combination, i.e., sentence consistent with the
upper part of face, and inconsistent with the lower, were not used.
Situations in which one tries to mask the truly experienced
emotion and then formulate sentence consistent with it do not
appear in interpersonal interactions. 22 unique sets of inconsistent
emotional expressions and sentence were created.
In the FDT we decided to create two series of photo-sentence
sets. In each series the same 36 photo-sentence sets were presented
in different, pseudo-random order. The series were presented one
after another without any pause. As a result each photo-sentence
set was presented twice. We assumed that using multiple instances
of each stimulus should improve reliability of the test.
Stimuli were presented as follows (see Figure 1). Each
presentation of facial expression lasted 2 s and was preceded with
a fixation point presented in the middle of a screen. Next, a second
fixation point was viewed for 1 s. Subsequently, a sentence was
presented, accompanied by a four-point Likert-type scale to assess
whether and to what degree a participant agrees that the statement
could be honestly said by the person previously imaged. The
response options were: 1 – definitely disagree, 2 – somewhat
disagree, 3 – somewhat agree, 4 – definitely agree. The 4-point
scale was applied instead of simple honest vs. dishonest decision, as
we presumed that EI will influence not only detection of deception
accuracy, but also the confidence of the answer. Afterwards, one
more fixation point was presented, preceding presentation of the
next trial. The program recorded participants’ evaluation of each
sentence as well as their reaction times. For each trial, the
participant was awarded 1–4 points. On consistent trials, point
allocations were as follows: definitely disagree = 1, somewhat
disagree = 2, somewhat agree = 3, definitely agree = 4. On
inconsistent trials, scoring was reversed, i.e., ‘definitely disagree’
was scored as 4, and ‘definitely agree’ as 1.
For each participant we obtained a total score in FDT and
subscale scores for each condition: 1) basic emotions with
congruent sentence, 2) basic emotions with non-congruent
sentence, and 3) inconsistent emotions subscales. Moreover, the
former two could be aggregated together as a 4) basic emotion
condition. Each scale was scored by dividing the sum of points
gained in all trials of a subscale by the number of trials. Thus, in
each case the score ranges between 1 (the poorest performance
possible) to 4 (the best possible performance). A value of 2.5 is
expected by a chance.
Emotional Intelligence and Detection of Deception
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Procedure
Participants were tested individually. The Emotional Intelli-
gence Test (TIE) was administered first, followed by FDT (Face
Decoding Test. The whole procedure lasted about 40 minutes.
Results
Face decoding test (FDT) - Psychometric properties
The FDT scores rather closely approximates to a normal
distribution, both in the case of total score (M= 2.78, SD= 0.25,
skewness = .53; kurtosis = .77; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test value
= 0.85, p= .43) and for subscales: basic emotions scale (M= 3.17,
SD= 0.33, skewness =2.21; kurtosis =2.51; Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test value = 0.89, p= .41); basic emotions with congruent
sentences subscale (M= 3.22, SD= 0.38, skewness =2.21; kurto-
sis =2.34; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test value = 1.09, p = .18); basic
emotions with non-congruent sentences subscale (M= .13,
SD= 0.41, skewness =2.26; kurtosis =2.13; Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test value = 1.18, p= .13); inconsistent emotions scale
(M= 2.53, SD= 0.31, skewness = .52; kurtosis = .41; Kolmo-
gorov-Smirnov test value = 0.89, p= .41).
As anticipated, a one-way ANOVA showed that the differences
between subscale means were significant, F(2,416) = 300.66, p,
.001, partial g2 = 0.59. Performance was highest for the basic
emotions with congruent sentence subscale, lower for the basic
emotions with non-congruent sentence subscale and the lowest for
the inconsistent emotions scale. Post-hoc analyses (Scheffe tests)
revealed significant differences between each subscale, all signif-
icant at p,.01 level.
The test revealed sufficient reliability, with Cronbach’s alphas of
.87 for total score (0,74 for first series and 0,78 for second series),
.83 for basic emotions scale, .78 for basic emotions with congruent
sentences subscale, .77 for basic emotions with non-congruent
sentences subscale, .86 for inconsistent emotions scale. The
correlation between first and second series amounted to r= .78,
p,.001 for total score. This result confirms the FDT’s reliability.
Gender differences
A t-test for independent samples was conducted to compare
results for men and women on TIE and FDT. The analyses
showed that women (M= 27.97, SD= 5.12) scored significantly
higher than men (M= 25.46, SD= 6.15) in TIE total score,
t(201.34) = 3.22, p,.001, d= 0.45. Women obtained also higher
results on all subscales of the emotional intelligence test (see
table 1), with effect sizes ranging between .36 and .40. Therefore,
the hypothesis H2 was confirmed.
Also, in the FDT females (M= 2.83, SD= 0.26) scored higher
than men (M= 2.74, SD= 0.24), t(208) = 2.74, p= .007, d= 0.38,
which fully confirmed hypothesis H3. Further analyses revealed
that this difference resulted mainly from females’ advantage in
detection of inconsistency, for the basic emotions with congruent
communicates subscale was the only case in which the gender
difference was not significant (see table 1).
Relationships between EI and FDT performance
Further analyses were conducted to analyze a pattern of
relationships between IE total score and branch scores and
performance in the FDT test.
Analyses conducted on the whole sample revealed a systematic
pattern of positive relationships between EI and all FDT measures,
including emotional incongruence detection, with Pearson’s r
ranging between .20 and .38, all significant at p,.01 (see table 2),
which fully confirmed hypothesis H1.
Although the EI vs. FDT correlations were uniformly positive,
there was some variation in magnitude. To test the extent to which
the four TIE branches were differentiated as predictors of FDT,
five multiple regressions were run. In each case, the four TIE
branches were entered as predictors in a single step, and each of
the five FDT measures, including total score, was treated as the
criterion. All five equations were significant at p,.01, with R2
values ranging from .07 to .16. For all equations, except that with
inconsistent emotions as the criterion, TIE perception branch
score was the only significant predictor; bs ranged from .18
(p= .05) to .26 (p,.01). In the inconsistent emotions equation, no
single predictor was significant. These analyses suggest that
emotion perception may play the most important role in
processing basic emotions, but the relationship between EI and
processing of inconsistent emotional expressions is best attributed
to EI as a whole, rather than any particular branch. Table 2 also
shows that for all FDT subscales, except basic emotions –
congruent, overall EI was at least as strongly correlated with
performance as was emotion perception. Thus, in subsequent
analyses we focus primarily on total EI as a predictor of the FDT.
It is worth mentioning that the FDT general score proved
significantly negatively related to reaction time in the test, r=2
0.14, p,.05. The result suggests that an ‘‘intuitive’’ strategy (i.e.,
characterized by rapid reactions) may be more effective than a
‘‘reflective’’, strategy of deliberating over the response. However,
further analyses showed that the negative correlation was
significant only between reaction time and score on the basic
emotions and congruent sentence subscale, r=20.16, p,.05. This
would rather suggest that the effect may simply reflect indecisive-
ness of individuals who were dealing poorly with this FDT
condition. Moreover, no significant relationship between EI and
FDT reaction time was obtained, both for the whole test and
subscales.
Next, we repeated the correlation analyses separately for each
gender, to test whether the criterion validity of EI generalized
Figure 1. The structure of the example stimuli (facial expression) presentation in FDT (Face Decoding Test).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092570.g001
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across both. This analysis (see table 3) revealed that the obtained
relationships were particularly strong in women, with correlations
ranging between .20 and .55 level. In men, correlation coefficients
reached the .05 significance level only for basic emotions with
congruent sentence, and only for perception and assimilation
branches (i.e., for ‘‘experiential’’ EI as defined by Mayer, Salovey
and Caruso [59]). To check the significance of the between-
gender differences in strength of EI-FDT correlations, we
performed series of comparisons of Pearson’s r coefficients
between genders using Steiger’s Z. The differences proved
significant for Basic emotions scale (especially for the non-
congruent part) and for total FDT scores. In each of these cases
the relationships were stronger in females, and in no case were
they stronger in males. Thus, whereas in females EI appeared
beneficial in all FDT conditions, in males emotional abilities
facilitated performance only in the ‘congruent’ condition (i.e.,
when there was no ‘‘deception’’ to be detected).
To investigate whether gender was a moderator of the
relationship between EI and FDT performance, we performed
interaction analyses, predicting each of the FDT scale scores with
total EI score, gender and EI x gender interaction terms
(centered). The models were significant in each case. The
interaction terms were significant for all FDT dimensions, with
an exception for the inconsistent emotions condition (see table 4).
To illustrate the obtained interactions we used Interaction!
1.4.1903 software by Daniel S. Soper [68], which allows for
plotting graphical interpretation of the moderation effect. The
effect was qualitatively similar for each of the FDT subscales and
total score. Thus Figure 2 presents the interaction effect for total
score, to illustrate the general form of the interactions.
Finally, we attempted to verify whether gender differences in EI
could explain the gender difference in facial decoding. We
therefore conducted mediation analyses (see figures 3, 4 and 5) for
those FDT dimensions that revealed significant gender differenc-
es, i.e., basic emotions with non-congruent sentence, inconsistent
emotions and total score. All three analyses revealed significant
mediation effects, with Sobel test [69] values of 22.68, 22.25 and
22.78, respectively, all significant at p,.05 level (however for
inconsistent and basic emotions scales it is only partial mediation).
Therefore, we may conclude that EI mediates between gender
and effectiveness of deception detection. The H4 hypothesis was
then also confirmed.
Discussion
In this study, we investigated effects of EI and gender on
performance on a novel facial emotion processing task (FDT),
designed to simulate emotional deception detection. All formu-
lated hypotheses were confirmed. More emotionally intelligent
individuals performed better in all conditions of the FDT (H1).
We also confirmed that females scored higher than males on both
EI (H2) and FDT scores (H3). Interestingly, the gender difference
on the FDT was significant only in the inconsistent FDT
conditions. The mediation analysis confirmed H4, that gender
differences in facial processing were mediated by EI. We also
obtained two findings that were not hypothesized. The emotion
perception branch of EI was the branch most predictive of
performance when faces displayed basic emotions, but not when
the facial emotion expression was inconsistent. We also found an
intriguing gender difference in the correlational data; EI was more
strongly associated with the FDT in women than in men, as
confirmed by a test for moderation. In the remainder of this
section, we discuss further the utility of the FDT in research on
deception, and the roles of EI and gender in deception detection.
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Comments about FDT
The rationale for developing the FDT was that detecting
inconsistencies between facial and verbal cues may be one strategy
that people use to detect deception [46]. However, it could be
arguable whether FDT indeed measures deception detection.
Much prior research, inspired by Ekman’s [70] seminal studies,
has focused only on facial cues in isolation, e.g., detection of
masked and simulated emotions [26]. Facial processing alone may
indeed provide cues to deception. However, research reviewed by
Barrett, Mesquita, and Gendron [71] shows that accurate emotion
decoding relies on both processing of both facial expression and of
concurrent contextual cues. Consistent with this principle, the
FDT is not solely a facial processing task, but one which asks the
respondent to evaluate verbal statements in the context provided
by the facial emotion. Yet the experimental design endorsed by
this authors was substantially different from FDT.
As a new task, findings from the FDT must be evaluated with
caution. However, several features of the data suggest its utility as
a research instrument. There were substantial overall differences
in performance across conditions consistent with existing research.
When the face stimulus displayed a basic emotion, mean
performance was close to the upper end of the scale in both
consistent and inconsistent sentence conditions. The near-ceiling
levels of performance are consistent with the proposal that basic
emotions are universal, and so emotion processing is highly
accurate [4,70]. The accuracy of processing extends not just to
emotion recognition, but also to detection of inconsistency when
the facial expression is unambiguous. By contrast, the mean score
of 2.53 for inconsistent emotions expressions does not differ from
the chance expectation of 2.5. The difficulty of detecting
inconsistency under these conditions corresponds to findings that
naı¨ve participants typically do only a little better than chance in
detection of deceptive facial emotion [8,26].
Psychometric properties of the FDT are also encouraging.
Distributions of scores in each condition were approximately
normal, and acceptably internally consistent. Importantly, al-
though there may be concerns about ceiling (basic emotion) and
floor (inconsistent emotion) effects, reliable individual differences
were obtained in each condition. In addition, the congruent basic
emotions score was uncorrelated with the inconsistent emotions
score, implying that the latter measures some ability more specific
than either emotion recognition or sentence-image matching.
Some limitations of the FDT should also be noted. The face
stimulus is artificial, in that prototypical facial expressions were
created by averaging the photos/pictures of individual faces. Thus,
the respondent views only a single ‘person’ expressing different
emotions. However, using artificially generated facial expressions
is quite common and accepted in contemporary cognitive science
(e.g., [46,72]). Furthermore, this individual was male, which may
influence gender differences. Possibly, women have a special
facility in reading male faces, although to date there is little
evidence that congruence between participant gender and stimulus
gender enhances recognition of emotion from facial expression
[43,73]. Finally, the stimulus presentation sequence separates the
presentation of face and sentence, although naturalistically
changing facial expression would accompany speech.
In future research, the FDT could be validated together with
more established measures/paradigms of lie detection (for example
a videotape study in which participants have to detect lies of the
actors – e.g., [20,74]). Apart from content and construct validation
such a procedure could test whether the same or different skills are
involved in both tasks. If results are promising, the FDT might
eventually be used as a standardized assessment tool for deception
detection.
EI and deception
The data suggest a rather straightforward advantage for
individuals high in EI, as assessed by the TIE. In the whole
sample, all four TIE branch scores were significantly correlated
with all three of the distinct FDT scores. Correlation magnitudes
were similar, ranging from .18–31, although, as discussed below,
there was rather more heterogeneity in correlations when males
and females are examined separately. The aggregated total TIE
and FDT scores showed a somewhat stronger association (r= .38)
suggesting quite good criterion validity for the TIE as a predictor
of detection of both consistency and inconsistency. EI appears to
Table 4. Testing significance of EI x Gender interaction terms for FDT total and subscale scores.
Model statistics Interaction term statistics
Dependent variable F(3,206) R2 p b DR2 p
I. Basic emotions 16.26 .18 ,.001 2.22 .05 ,.001
II. Basic emotions – congruent part 9.86 .13 ,.001 2.13. .02 .047
III. Basic emotions – non congruent part 16.17 .18 ,.001 2.23 .05 ,.001
IV. Inconsistent emotions 7.01 .09 ,.001 2.11 .01 .100
V. FDT total score 16.55 .18 ,.001 2.19 .04 .003
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092570.t004
Figure 2. The relationship between EI and FDT score as
moderated by gender.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092570.g002
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be advantageous irrespective of the difficulty of identifying
inconsistency.
To the extent that the FDT taps processes that contribute to
real-life detection of deception, the data suggest that emotionally
intelligent individuals have an advantage in this respect in
everyday interpersonal situations. Indeed, EI measured as an
ability may contribute to range of social skills that support
interpersonal functioning, as evidenced by several studies using the
MSCEIT [75]. Evidence for validity of an ability measure of EI
contrasts with the rather inconsistent evidence obtained in similar
paradigms using questionnaire scales for ‘trait’ EI [76].
The present findings leave open the exact nature of the
cognitive and/or emotional processes that may mediate EI – FDT
association. The association might be attributed to the role of
emotion perception as a foundational ability in the Mayer and
Salovey [51] model. Perhaps, those high in EI simply identify
facial emotion more accurately. In fact, the MSCEIT emotion
perception branch has not been found to be a reliable predictor of
performance on tasks requiring facial emotion processing [49]. For
example, Roberts et al. [77] found no relationship between the
MSCEIT emotion perception subtests and the JACBART test
[78], which is based on Ekman’s (e.g. [70,79]) work. Here, we
found that TIE emotion perception appeared from regression
analyses to be the strongest predictor of performance in FDT
conditions requiring decoding of basic emotion. By contrast with
the MSCEIT, the TIE uses verbal instead of facial and graphical
stimuli to assess emotion perception. Thus, the relationship
between emotion perception and the FDT here reflects more
than the common usage of facial stimuli in the two types of test.
Importantly, though there was no special advantage for emotion
perception in predicting performance in the inconsistent emotion
condition of the FDT. In this condition, which may be the one
most directly relevant to detection of deception, it may be general
EI rather than any specific branch that is most predictive of
performance.
We can advance two tentative explanations for the EI effect
with inconsistent emotional stimuli. First, the task may be
sufficiently complex to engage processes contributing to all four
branches. Second, the integration of emotional (facial) and
cognitive (linguistic) processes required to perform the task may
represent a core function that is central to all aspects of EI. This
hypothesis is compatible with Mayer and Salovey’s [51] view that
EI is a property of the linkages between emotion and cognition,
rather than each domain in isolation.
Gender differences
The advantage for females in ability EI is consistent with
previous MSCEIT studies, which suggest a moderate effect size of
around 0.5 SD (e.g., [60]), as here. Earlier studies conducted using
TIE also revealed comparable effects (e.g., Stolarski, Postek and
S´mieja reported a gender difference of .56 SD [80]). Effect sizes
were similar across all four branches of the TIE. The findings from
the FDT are also consistent with the general finding that females
tend to perform better on tasks requiring decoding of nonverbal
information, including facial expression. For example, in two
meta-analyses, Hall [32,43] found moderate effect sizes for the
gender difference both for studies requiring identifying or
interpreting nonverbal cues, and for the subset of studies
investigating only visual cues, including facial cues. These
nonverbal decoding cues may, in turn, contribute to the broader
advantage in social skills reported for females (e.g., [81]).
Collignon et al. [82] reported a particular advantage for women
Figure 3. Relationship between gender and FDT basic emotions with non-congruent sentence as mediated by EI. The standardized
regression coefficient between gender and deception detection controlling for EI is in parentheses. *p,.05, **p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092570.g003
Figure 4. Relationship between gender and FDT inconsistent emotions subscale score as mediated by EI. The standardized regression
coefficient between gender and deception detection controlling for EI is in parentheses. *p,.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092570.g004
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in recognizing multisensory emotional expressions, which they
attributed to integration of vocal and facial expressions. The
facility to integrate verbal and facial information is required for the
FDT also. Our results are also in line with Hoffmann et al.’s [45]
finding that gender differences are more pronounced for subtle
expressions than for full-blown or high-intensity emotion displays.
The current findings add to existing knowledge by showing that
gender differences are moderated by stimulus inconsistency. Males
and females were equally adept at detecting consistency with basic
emotion, but females were superior at detecting deception in both
basic emotion and inconsistent emotions conditions. Effect sizes
were similar to the value of d = .32 reported by Hall [43] for
processing of visual cues. Multiple processes may contribute to the
gender difference, but the effect here cannot be attributed either to
a general facial processing advantage (which would imply female
superiority in all conditions), or to an advantage in processing
complex expressions (which would be restricted to the inconsistent
condition). Women may be especially adept at processing
inconsistent cues.
The mediation analysis suggested that female processing
superiority might be attributed to higher EI. Consistent with our
account of EI, we might suppose either that women are superior in
a range of emotional competencies that jointly contribute to
detecting inconsistency, or in some core process for EI of
integrating cognitive and emotional information. However, there
are two wrinkles in this simple account of gender differences that
should be noted. First, high EI had an ‘across-the-board’ effect in
enhancing all aspects of FDT performance, whereas gender
differences depended on inconsistency. The mediation analysis
may not pick up subtle differences between the advantages of high
EI and the advantages of being female.
Second, the role of EI in the FDT seemed both stronger and less
differentiated in women than in men. In the latter group, only the
two ‘experiential’ branches of EI, perception and assimilation,
predicted FDT. A tentative suggestion is that women are more
motivated than men to rely on the explicit ‘strategic’ processes
represented by the understanding and management branches,
whereas men are reliant on more implicit, experiential processes.
Consistent with this suggestion, gender differences in empathic
accuracy (inferring the thoughts and feelings of another) appear to
depend more on greater social motivation among women than on
any basic ability [83]. Of course, over time, a greater interest in
the feelings of others may contribute to building skills for emotion
identification that may contribute to ability EI.
Tentatively, we suggest that our findings elucidate the
superiority of women in detection of deception in some contexts
[28]. In keeping with female superiority in decoding complex and
subtle emotional stimuli [82,45], women may also be better than
men at detecting inconsistency between conflicting facial and
verbal messages. This facility may be one of several competencies
that contribute to detection of dishonesty in naturalistic settings.
However, the use of artificial materials is a limitation of the current
study, and caution is necessary in generalizing conclusions to real
life deception.
Conclusion
The basic findings from this study tell a simple story, that
women are higher in men in general EI, and this ability helps
women to identify inconsistent facial and verbal stimuli more
readily. Such an ability might help women better detect emotional
deception in real life, compared to men. The most parsimonious
explanation for the performance advantage conferred by EI is that
integration of emotional and cognitive information is a core
attribute of EI, and one that is essential for detecting conflict
between cues. However, there is also another interpretation of that
effect. The relationship between EI and FDT could be a result of
some common underlying ability. For example, both emotion
perception and lie detection accuracy are considered part of
‘‘interpersonal sensitivity’’, defined as accuracy in perceiving,
judging, recalling, and responding to the (generally nonverbal)
behavior and appearance of others [84,85].
As a result, questions about the processing basis for the EI effect
remain, including also whether multiple processes mediate effects
on the FDT, the importance of motivation for performance, and
the balance of strategic and experiential processes across the two
genders. It also remains to be determined whether the FDT draws
on those cognitive-emotional processes that support emotion
deception in naturalistic settings.
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